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THE APPLICATION OF STANDING IN REVIEWING TAXATION 
DECISIONS 
RODNEY FISHER* 
A central aspect of the reform of administrative law in the 1970s was to provide 
increased administrative accountability by way of review of a range of administrative 
decisions and processes. However such review or appeal rights only subsist if a party 
has standing to seek such review or appeal. This paper examines the application of 
'standing' to seek review of taxation decisions. The paper focuses in particular on the 
decision in Allan v Transurban City Link to highlight how a narrow approach to 
statut01y interpretation in relation to the issue of standing may undermine the 
taxpayer's right of review. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The mid-1970s was a watershed period for administrative law refmm, with the 
codification of many of the common law actions, the intended outcome being a more 
transparent and more accountable government administration. A central aspect of this 
increased accountability provided for review of a range of administrative decisions 
and processes, in particular by means of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 1 (AAT), 
and by way of judicial review 2 
In broad terms, an application for review could be made to the AA T by a "person 
whose interests are affected"3 by the decision, while an application for judicial review 
of a decision becomes available to a "person aggrieved by a decision."4 There has 
been some judicial consideration as to the breadth of persons encompassed within 
these terms, with the paper outlining the outcomes from this judicial deliberation. The 
paper then explores the scope of the circumstances which allow for review or appeal 
of administrative decisions, in particular decisions relating to tax liability. 
In examining the issue of limitation of the right to seek review, the discussion 
focuses on the High Court decision of Allan v Transurban City Link Limited. 5 The 
discussion seeks to highlight the possibility of the legislature being able to subvert the 
underpinning rationale for the administrative remedies, albeit with the assistance of 
favourable court decisions. 
II THE ISSUE OF STANDING 
There have been a number of cases where the courts have considered the question of 
standing, with this review of judicial considerations highlighting some of the 
significant decisions which underlie the general principles applying to standing. In 
addition to these general principles, there are further legislative requirements for 
*Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Technology Sydney. 
1 Created by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 [AAT Act]. 
2 By means of the Administrative Decisians (Judicial Review) Act 1977 [(AD(JR) Act]. 
3 AAT Acts 27(1). 
4 AD(JR) Acts 5(1). 
5 (2001) 48 ATR 253. 
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standing in the tax context, and these are examined in the following section of the 
paper. 
In the decision in Boyce v Paddington Borough Council,6 Buckley J identified two 
circumstances where a plaintiff had a right to sue without joining the Attorney-
General: 
... first, where the interference with the public right is such as that some private right of his is at 
the same time interfered with ... and secondly, where no private right is interfered with, but the 
plaintiff, in respect of his public right, suffers special damage peculiar to himself from the 
interference with the public right7 
Subsequent cases have sought to ameliorate the complexity associated with 
application of these rules, with standing seen as not requiring special damage in the 
traditional sense, but requiring a plaintiff" ... having a special interest in the subject 
matter of the action ."8 However the application of such a principle would depend on 
the circumstance, since "The cases are infinitely various and so much depends in a 
given case on the nature of the relief which is sought, for what is a sufficient interest 
in one case may be less than sufficient in another."9 
A further question for consideration has arisen fi-om recognition that interests may 
be affected directly or indirectly, since " ... a decision which affects interests of one 
person directly may affect the interests of others indirectly. Across the pool of sundry 
interest, the ripples of affection may widely extend."10 In determining whether the 
strength of indirect interests is sufficient: 
The character of the decision is relevant, for if the interests relied on are of such a kind that a 
decision of the given character could not affect them directly, there must be some evidence to 
show that the interests are in truth affected. 11 
This issue of the relative strengths of indirect interests was addressed in Australian 
Foreman Stevedores Association v Crone, 12 with Pincus J recognising that: 
A decision favourable to one citizen may affect others: some directly, and some more remotely. 
There is a point, which must be fixed as a matter of judgement in each case, beyond which the 
Court must hold that the interests of those affected are too indirectly affected to be recognised. 13 
Where a statute provides recourse to review for a 'person aggrieved' or a 'person 
whose interests are affected,' statutory interpretation has a role to play, the court in 
Alphafarm Pty Ltd v Smith/dine Beecham (Australia) Pty Limited14 suggesting that: 
... it is important not to draw ... any general proposition which may be translated to the instant 
dispute. In each case, the content of the terms 'affect' and 'interest' are to be seen in the light of 
the scope and purpose of the particular statute in issue. 15 
This approach was again affirmed by Gummow J in Australian Institute for Marine 
and Power Engineers v Secretwy Department of Transport, 16 whereby " ... given the 
diversity of statutory provisions, no general proposition is to be established from these 
6 [1903]1 Ch 109. 
7 Ibid at 114. 
8 Went worth v Attorney-General (NSW) (1984) 154 CLR 518, per Gibbs CJ at 527. 
9 Robinson v Western Australian Museum (1977) 138 CLR 383 per Mason J at 327-8. 
10 Re McHattan and Collector of Customs (1977) 18 ALR 154 per Brennan J at 157. 
II Ibid. 
12 (1989) 20 FCR 377. 
13 Ibid at 382. 
14 (1994) 49 FCR 250. 
15 Ibid per Gummow J at 272. 
16 (1986) 13 FCR 124. 
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examples."17 Further," ... the nature of the interest required in a particular case will be 
influenced by the subject matter and context of the decision under review." 18 
III STANDING IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 
One of the factors creating difficulties in judicial review of the question of standing 
in taxation matters has been the different terminology in different legislation setting 
the threshold requirement for standing. 
The initiation of proceedings for review or appeal of an income tax assessment is 
provided in s 175A Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, which creates the right to 
object against an assessment for "a taxpayer who is dissatisfied with an assessment 
made in relation to the taxpayer". A literal reading of the provisions would suggest 
three threshold requirements to create the right to object, these being: 
• a taxpayer 
• dissatisfied with an assessment 
• where the assessment is made 'in relation to' the taxpayer. 
Section 175A directs dissatisfied taxpayers to Part IVC of the Tax Administration 
Act for objection procedures, and the subsequent review and appeal procedures if 
there is an unfavourable objection decision. Part IVC of the Tax Administration Act 
provides a uniform code of procedures which apply for objections, reviews and 
appeals under all Commonwealth tax statues, thus applying to income tax, fringe 
benefits tax, goods and services tax, and the superannuation guarantee charge. The 
application of a uniform code means that the threshold issue of standing will be the 
same for taxpayers seeking review under any of these taxing provisions. 
The requirements for further review or appeal are stated in s 14ZZ Tax 
Administration Act, with the right for review or appeal being available for "the person 
dissatisfied with the Commissioner's objection decision ... ". 
In the majority decision in McCallum v FCT 19, Lehane J concluded that: 
There can, I think, be no doubt that 'the person' referred to in s 14ZZ ... is the same person as 
the one referred to in s 14ZU itself ... and subs 14ZL(l) makes it clear that 'the person' 
concerned is the taxpayer referred to ins 175A ... who is dissatisfied with an assessment 'made 
in relation to the taxpayer' .20 
In a case involving a taxpayer seeking review of a private ruling, Hill J found in 
CTC Resources v FC:f1that: 
There is no definition of 'dissatisfied' in this context but the word must bear more than its 
ordinary dictionary meaning of 'displeased with' or 'not contented with'. More is required than 
mere lack of satisfaction with the objection decision. . . . In my opinion a person will only be 
'dissatisfied' in the relevant sense if that person is a person to whom the 'ruling' is still capable 
of having legal effect .... so that the ruling can not affect the taxation liability of a putative 
appellant, that person, no matter how discontented, will not be a 'person dissatisfied. ' 22 
At issue in McCallum v FCT was whether a bankrupt taxpayer had standing to 
appeal or seek review. Hill J, in a minority decision, noted the range of terminology 
17 Ibid at 131. 
18 United States Tobacco Company Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 520 at 529. 
19 97 ATC 4509. 
20 Ibid at 4521. 
21 94 ATC 4072. 
22 Ibid at 4100. 
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relating to standing, including the expressions 'person dissatisfied', 'person 
interested', 'person affected', and 'person aggrieved'. His Honour concluded that the 
divergent expressions may be seen to indicate shades of difference, such that it would 
" ... not be wholly safe to extrapolate from decisions on the one set of words the 
outcome where dependent upon another set ofwords."23 
The majority decision24 in McCallum held that while a bankrupt taxpayer did not 
satisfY the requirement for review or appeal in their own name, the trustee in 
bankruptcy did have standing. The decision was based on the High Court decision in 
Cummins v Claremont Petroleum25 , with Whitlam J following the view in Cummins 
that it is fundamental to the law of bankruptcy that the bankrupt is divested of liability 
for his provable debts, and as the taxation debt is a provable debt of which the 
bankrupt is divested," ... he will not be the person to whom 'the objection decision' is 
still capable of having legal effect"26 
In a strong dissenting view, Hill J noted that Ellicott J in Tooheys v Minister for 
Business and Consumer Affairi7 suggested that "The words 'a person who is 
aggrieved' should not, in my view, be given a narrow construction."28 Hill J was 
inclined to the view that 'dissatisfaction' provided a broader gateway than 
'aggrieved', warning that if the criteria for review were set narrowly, the objects of 
administrative review could be frustrated.'9 His Honour was of the view that, while 
dissatisfaction required more than a mere intellectual or emotional interest,30 there 
should be no requirement to demonstrate that a legal right was affected to make out 
'dissatisfaction' .31 
Lehane J argued against this broader interpretation, suggesting that it was not easy to 
see that a test of dissatisfaction with a decision should confer standing on a taxpayer 
to a more generous extent than a right of appeal does for a party adversely affected by 
a decision. 32 His Honour noted that a taxpayer who lacked standing, as with a 
bankrupt, wanted to challenge an assessment, the Court could exercise its power to 
prevent injustice or oppression. 33 
The waming by Hill J as to the dangers of a narrow interpretation of expression 
granting standing, and the potential for a narrow approach to defeat the objects of 
administrative review, may have been prophetic, given the long running legal battle 
which ultimately ended in the High Court as Allan v Transurban. 34 The progress of 
this case is charted below, with a review of the question of standing at each stage of 
the proceedings. 
IV ALLAN V TRANSURBAN CITY LINK 
The case involving Peter Allan's quest to be recognised as having standing as a 
'person affected' followed a long, and ultimately futile, path. After commencing in 
23 McCallum v FCT 97 ATC 4509 at 4515. 
24 Lehane & Whitlam JJ. 
25 (1995) 185 CLR 124. 
26 McCallum v FCT 97 ATC 4509 at 4518. 
27 (1981) 36 ALR 64. 
28 Ibid at 79. 
29 McCallum v FCT 97 ATC 4509 at 4516. 
30 See for exampleACFv Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493. 
31 McCallum v FCT 97 ATC 4509 at 4516. 
32 Ibid at 4522. 
33 Ibid at 4523. 
34 Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd [2001] HCA 58; (2001) 48 A TR 253. 
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the AA T in the mid 1990s, the case progressed through the Federal Court to the Full 
Federal Court, from whence it was remitted to the AAT, and again progressed through 
the Federal Court and Full Federal Court, until eventually reaching the High Court. 
The decision against which Allan sought review was a decision of the Development 
Allowance Authority (DAA), a body created under the Development Allowance 
Authority Act (DAA Act) for the purpose of issuing certificates which granted tax 
concessions where privately funded large public infrastructure projects met certain 
criteria. Under s 930 of the DAA Act, where the DAA was satisfied that the 
conditions had been met there was no discretion to refuse a certificate. 
Additionally, the applicant for a certificate was the only party with a right to be 
heard by the DAA, the only party from which the DAA could seek information and 
documents, and the only party to which notice of the decision had to be given, there 
being no requirement for public notification of receipt of an application or a decision 
on the application. 
The provision of the DAA Act at issue was s 119, which provided in relevant part: 
(1) A person who is affected by a reviewable decision may, if dissatisfied with the decision, by 
notice given to the DAA ... 
request the DAA to reconsider the decision. 
(3) Upon receipt of the request, the DAA must reconsider the decision .... " 
Section 120 of the DAA Act provided that: 
"Applications may be made to the AAT for review of decisions of the DAA that have been 
confirmed or varied .... " 
The DAA decision for which Allan sought review involved the issuing of a 
certificate for construction of a freeway to within one hundred metres of his home. 
Allan requested the DAA to reconsider its decision, under s 199 of the DAA Act, the 
response from the DAA being to decline to reconsider on the basis that Allan was not 
a 'person who is affected by the decision.' 
A First Round of Hearings 
lAAT 
On the basis that the failure by the DAA to reconsider its decision amounted to a 
confirmation of the decision, Allan applied to the AA T for a review of the DAA 
decision. 
At first instance in the AA T, the Tribunal considered that the degree of adverse 
affection was too remote for Allan to be classed as a 'person whose interests are 
affected', and as he was not therefore a 'person affected by a reviewable decision', the 
AAT had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. 
Undeterred by this setback, Allan took the case to the Federal Court/5 where it was 
first heard by Mansfield J. 
35 Peter Allan v Development Allowance Authority (1997] 738 FCA. 
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2 Federal Court 
From a consideration of the authorities, Mansfield J concluded that ultimately the 
question turned on what Parliament intended by the expression 'a person who is 
affected by .. .'the decision ins 119 of the DAA Act. While assuming that Allan was 
a person who had suffered 'special damage' within the terms of Boyce, His Honour 
concluded that Allan was not encompassed as a 'person affected' within the meaning 
of the Act, and as such the DAA and AA T were correct in their assertion. The 
meaning ascribed to the Act in the following broad areas led to this conclusion. 
Firstly, only the applicant for a certificate had input to the decision process. On this 
basis His Honour considered that: 
... it is not likely that the parliament contemplated by s 119 that a person who had chosen not to 
participate in these primary detenninative processes ... should by reason of special interests of 
the nature claimed have another opportunity to achieve indirectly what the person had not 
achieved directly .36 
Further, as only the applicant for the certificate was entitled to notification of the 
DAA decision, with no requirement for public notification, the intention of the 
legislature was that the decision process be private. 
Additionally, as the Act provided a period for review of twenty-one days after the 
decision came to the person's attention, His Honour felt that the intention was to limit 
review to the applicant. To adopt a different interpretation would leave open-ended 
the period for review, which would not have been the intention of Parliament. 
Finally, His Honour considered that the decision under complaint was not the 
decision directly causing the special damage of which Allan complained, as the 
decision at issue had an outcome of the project attracting finance and tax concessions. 
For these reasons Mansfield J concluded that s 119 of the DAA Act should have a 
narrow interpretation, with " a person who is affected" being limited basically to the 
original applicant for a DAA certificate. His Honour found this conclusion to be 
apparent both from the legislative provision, and from general principles enunciated 
by the High Court. 
3 Full Federal Court 
On appeal to the Full Federal Court, the decision of Mansfield J was overturned by 
all members of the Court. 37 The decisions of Wilcox and R D Nicholson JJ are 
examined below, Finn J being substantially in agreement with them. 
In the view of Wilcox J, the fundamental defect in the argument of the respondent 
was failing to draw the distinction between the criteria relevant to the statutory 
decision, and the subject matter of the litigation challenging the decision. His Honour 
found that, using ordinary language, a person whose residential amenity would likely 
be diminished is a person affected by the decision, which raised a question of degree, 
as a special interest is required to confer standing. Where His Honour differed from 
Mansfield J was that he did not agree with the further requirement that the special 
interest be related to the objects, scope or purpose of the legislation under which the 
decision had been made. 
In reviewing the authorities, His Honour considered that Boyce was the seminal 
decision in the area, and the second leg of the standing rule proposed by Buckley J 
36 Mansfield J at 12 of 14. 
37 Allan v Development Authority [1998]112 FCA; Wilcox, R D Nicholson, and Finn JJ. 
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had been reformulated by Gibbs J in ACF to refer to a person "having a special 
interest in the subject matter of the action."38 In explanation of this special interest, 
Gibbs J noted that " ... an interest for present purposes, does not mean a mere 
intellectual or emotional concern."39 Rather, a special interest required the plaintiff 
gaining some advantage other than general satisfaction if the action succeeded, or 
suffering some disadvantage if it did not. 
The majority of the Court in Onus v Alcoa411 adopted this concept of 'special 
interest', with Gibbs CJ expounding on the meaning as " ... an interest in the subject 
matter of the present action which is greater than that of other members of the 
public."41 In explanation of the concept, Stephen J saw it involving " ... a curial 
assessment of the importance of the concern which a plaintiff has with particular 
subject matter and of the closeness of that plaintiff's relationship to that subject 
matter."42 
Further, in Shop Distributive and Allied Employees Association v Minister for 
Industrial Affairs South Australia,43 (SDAEA), the Full High Court suggested that the 
" ... rule is flexible and the nature and subject matter of the litigation will dictate what 
amounts to a special interest."44 
The point made by Wilcox J was that in none of these cases was it suggested that the 
nature of the special interest was to be determined by reference to the scope and 
purpose of the legislation. Additionally: 
In none of the High Court cases is there any suggestion that the concern that amounts to a 
special interest must be the same concern as that which motivated the legislature in enacting the 
legislation out of which the action arose ... it was enough that members of the appellant 
organization had an interest in the validity of the certificates that transcended that of the public 
generally. 45 
On the basis of these authorities, Wilcox J was able to determine that Mansfield J 
had erred in finding a legislative intent that a 'person who is affected' in terms of s 
119(1) was limited to the applicant for a certificate. Wilcox J further noted that 
Mansfield J had assumed that Allan had suffered special damage, which in the view of 
Wilcox J would make Allan a 'person who is affected.' 
The order proposed by His Honour was to allow the appeal, but remit the matter to 
the AA T for the making of a finding as to the position of Allan. 
R D Nicholson J concurred with the orders made by Wilcox J. His Honour found 
that the test for standing from Shop Distributive and Allied Employees Association 
was whether the plaintiffs could establish the existence of a special interest in the 
subject matter of the litigation,46 and that it was apparent from the authorities that the 
" ... concept of special interest is wider than the concept of special damage."47 
His Honour relied on the finding in Onus that: 
Whether a plaintiff has shown a sufficient interest in a particular case must be a question of 
degree, but not a question of discretion ... At least the plaintiff must be able to show that 
success in the action would confer on him ... a benefit or advantage greater than the benefit or 
38 Ibid at 3 of 16 referring to ACF v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493 per Gibbs J at 527. 
39 ACF v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493 per Gibbs J at 530. 
40 (1981) 149 CLR 27. 
41 Ibid per Gibbs CJ at 36. 
42 Ibid per Stephen J at 42. 
43 (1995) 183 CLR 552. 
44 Ibid at 558. 
45 Allan v Development Authority [1998]112 FCA at 4 of 16. 
46 SDAEA v Minister for Industrial Affairs South Australia (1995) 183 CLR 552at 558. 
47 Allan v Development Authority [1998]112 FCA per Nicholson J at 12-13. 
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advantage conferred upon the ordinary member of the community; or alternatively that success 
in the action would relieve him of a detriment or disadvantage ... to an extent greater than the 
ordinary member of the community.48 
This test was considered to be met in the instant case, since "The special damage lies 
within the point in the pool of sundry interest at which the affection is not remote."49 
Further, His Honour found no basis for the limitation by inference drawn from the 
legislation by Mansfield J, by which the provision operated to limit the class of 
applicants who could seek review. 
B Second Round of Hearings 
The case, then, returned to the place from whence it had started its journey, coming 
again before the AA T for the determination of whether Allan was a person affected 
within the terms of s 119( I) of the DAA. 
IAAT 
Further complexity arose at the AA T hearing when the issue of Allan having moved 
his residence was raised. This then broached the additional question as to the temporal 
nature of standing, and whether Allan was no longer a person affected by the DAA 
decision, the issue being whether standing was required only at the time the person 
was affected by the decision, or whether the requirement is ongoing. 
In essence, the AA T concluded that to have standing, Allan needed to demonstrate 
that at the time of this further hearing he retained a special interest in the subject 
matter of the DAA decision. By virtue of having moved residence, the AAT was not 
satisfied that Allan met the requirement for such an interest, and affirmed the decision 
under review, being the initial AAT decision that Allan was not a person affected by 
the DAA decision. 
Interestingly, the AAT affirmed the previous decision, although it did so by the 
consideration of different facts, which arguably was not what the referral from the 
Full Federal Court had asked of it. 
2 Federal Court 
Allan again appealed against the decision of the AAT, with the matter agam 
returning to the Federal Court, 5° this time before Merkel J. 
In looking to the AAT Act, His Honour determined that ss 27 and 29 required only 
that standing exist at the date on which application for review is made to the AAT, 
there being nothing to indicate that the requirement for standing was ongoing. 
Additionally His Honour saw the " ... concept of standing being 'lost' or 'gained' 
according to the circumstances existing from time to time (as) an unsatisfactory basis 
for determining a person's right to commence and continue a proceeding .... "51 
While the AAT had based its decision on the ACF test enunciated by Gibbs J, 
Merkel J considered that this framed the question in narrow terms, importing a test 
that would not be "... accepted as necessarily applicable to all cases of standing to 
48 Onus v Alcoa (1981) 149 CLR 27 per Brennan J at 75. 
49 Allan v Development Auth01?ty [1998]112 FCA per Nicholson at 15. 
50 Allan v Development Allowance Authority [1999] FCA 426. 
51 Ibid at para 39. 
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seek administrative review."52 Rather, His Honour concluded that more recent cases 
evidenced a more flexible test based on a special interest greater than, or different in 
kind from, ordinary members of the community, 53 with s 27 of the AAT Act being 
flexible in its application. 
By confining its enquiry into whether Allan had actually proved special damage, 
Merkel J found that the AA T had erred in law by approaching the issue of special 
damage or sufficiency of interest too narrowly. His Honour considered that Allan's 
standing arose from an accrued right to reconsideration of the DAA decision, with 
that standing not being affected by the change in residence. 54 
As a result, the decision in the case held that the AAT had erred in law by failing to 
consider whether Allan was a person affected by the DAA decision, being the matter 
which had been referred for determination to it by the Full Federal Court. Merkel J 
again remitted the matter to the AA T for determination of this issue. 
3 Full Federal Court 
By this stage of the proceedings it came as no great surprise when, instead of 
returning to the AA T, the matter progressed on appeal yet again to the Full Federal 
Court, 55 on this occasion sitting as a five-member bench. 56 
(a) Reconsideration by Full Federal Court 
Before consideration of the substantive matter at issue, the Court deliberated on the 
question of whether the Court should reconsider a previous Full Court decision. While 
the Court was of the view that "It is not in doubt that a Full Court of this Court has 
power to decline to follow the previous decision of a differently constituted Full 
Court,"57 it was felt that "Decisions of a Full Court of this Court are entitled to due 
respect and will not be lightly departed from."58 In reaching this conclusion, regard 
was had to the judgement in Nguyen v Nguyen 59 where it was observed that "Where a 
court of appeal holds itself free to depart from an earlier decision it should do so 
cautiously and only when compelled to the conclusion that the earlier decision is 
wrong."60 
From a review of the authorities the Court determined that " ... we do not think it 
possible, or even desirable, to formulate exhaustive criteria upon which this Court 
should act when asked to reconsider an earlier decision,"61 with the arguments and 
circumstances being among the determining factors. The Court found some unusual 
features in the circumstances in the case, not least that Transurban had not been a 
party to the previous case yet had a serious interest, and that the previous Full Court 
would have been assisted by the arguments advanced by Transurban. 
52 Ibid at para 55. 
53 Ibid at para 56. 
54 Ibid at para 68. 
55 Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan [1999] FCA 1723. 
56 Black CJ, Hill, Sundberg, Marshall and Kenny JJ. 
57 Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan [1999] FCA 1723 at para 27. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Nguyen v Nguyen (!990) 169 CLR 245. 
60 Ibid per Dawson, Toohey & McHugh JJ at 268-269. 
61 Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan [1999] FCA 1723 at para 31. 
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On this basis the Court took the view that the " ... circumstances provide sufficient 
reason for the Court to embark upon a consideration of whether the previous decision 
was wrongly decided."62 
(b) T11e question of standing 
Having satisfied itself that it was not inappropriate for the Court to reconsider a 
previous Full Court decision, the Court turned to address the issue of standing. 
The Court looked to the decision in Bateman's Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council 
v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Ltd,63 a decision subsequent to the previous 
Full Court decision in the current case, and noted that the leading judgement64 pointed 
out that is was significant in matters of standing to have regard to the considerations 
upon which equity intervenes in public law cases, the basis for such intervention 
being found in the public interest in the maintenance of due administration.65 It was 
noted that this judgement approved of the fmding in Shop Distributive and Allied 
Employees Association where it had been noted that the danger of adopting a precise 
formula for determining what was sufficient for a special interest could have the effect 
of unduly restricting the availability of equitable remedies to support the public 
interest in due administration66 
Also from the Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund, McHugh J had noted that a 
special interest in the subject matter of the proceedings sufficed to give standing67 
This suggested that for the Court to disturb the previous Full Court decision would 
require a fmding that Allan had no special interest in the subject matter, where four 
previous judges had found there was such an interest. 
The Court relied on the test for standing from ACF, requiring a special interest 
greater than others in the community. In looking to the factors of relevance in this 
consideration, the Court drew on the decision in North Coast Environment Council 
Ltd v Minister for Natural Resources,68 where the view of Aickin J was that to qualify 
as special interest, the interest must be related to the relief claimed. Following this 
view, the Court considered that if granting relief did not further the interests of the 
plaintiff, or failure to grant relief did not cause harm, then " ... common sense would 
suggest that the applicant for judicial review would lack standing."69 
While the Court could find no support for this view in later High Court cases, with 
Onus suggesting the relationship should be between the applicant and the subject 
matter of the proceedings rather than between the applicant and the outcome of the 
proceedings, neither could the Court fmd anything to suggest consideration of the 
outcome would be irrelevant. On this basis the Court was able to conclude that " ... 
there will be no standing where the actual outcome of the review will not affect the 
applicant."70 
In applying these considerations to the current case, the Court took the view that the 
subject matter of the review was the decision to issue certificates which affected the 
62 Ibid. 
63 (1998) 194 CLR 247. 
64 Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ. 
65 Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan [1999] FCA 1723 at para 38. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid at para 39. 
68 (1994) 55 FCR 492. 
69 Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan [1999] FCA 1723 at para 46. 
70 Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan [1999] FCA 1723 at para 50. 
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tax treatment of the infrastructure borrowings, so for Allan to establish standing for 
review of that decision it was necessary for him to demonstrate an interest in the 
decision as to the tax treatment for a borrower or lender. Further, in terms of the 
outcomes, it was relevant to consider whether at the time of application, the interest 
he claimed would be advanced or harmed by the outcome of the review. 
By taking this narrow approach, the Court was able to determine that Allan had no 
greater interest in the tax treatment of the loans than any other member of the 
community, and while he did have an interest in whether the infrastructure project 
should proceed, that interest was too remote from the decision for which he sought 
. 71 
rev1ew. 
In highlighting the significance to be attached to the outcome from the review in 
determining standing, the Court did allow that the object, scope and purpose of the 
legislation was relevant, but denied that it could be the only relevant matter. 72 
Nevertheless, largely on the basis that he had no special interest in the outcome of 
the decision, narrowly construed, the Court reversed the previous decision of the Full 
Federal Court and found that Allan was not a person affected by the decision, and 
accordingly lacked standing. 73 
(c) Approach of Full Federal Court 
The fmding of the Court is an interesting decision in a number of areas, with some 
of these briefly examined before returning to the continuing Allan saga, which was 
nearing its conclusion. 
The Court paid regard to the decision in Aboriginal Community Benefit Trust, 
pmticularly to the view of Gaudron, Gumrnow and Kirby JJ that in determining 
standing, regard should be had to considerations upon which equity intervenes in 
public law, the basis for intervention being the public interest in the maintenance of 
due administration. The considerations of public interest suggest a broad 
interpretation being given to the special interest required for standing, with the 
impression being created that the Court would have regard to this broad public interest 
view in deciding the instant case. 
However, while noting the comments from Shop Distributive and Allied Employees 
Association as to the danger of adopting a precise formula as to the requirements for 
special interest, the danger being to constrict the remedies available, the Court then 
appears to overlook the High Court cases as to the requisite relationship to establish 
special interest and standing, and draws instead on a Federal Court decision. 
Further, the comments relied on from the decision in North Coast may arguably 
appear at odds with the High Court authority, the decision suggesting that it is the 
outcome from the proceedings, rather than the subject matter of the proceedings, 
which is determinative. By setting this as the criteria, the decision of the Court may be 
at odds with the warning from Shop Distributive and Allied Employees Association as 
to adopting too precise a formulation as to the sufficiency for special interest and 
standing. 
Finally, in applying the 'outcome' test, the Court arguably takes a quite narrow 
interpretation of the decision in question. While the decision as to the issue of a 
certificate by the DAA does determine the tax treatment for the infrastructure loan, 
71 Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan [1999] FCA 1723 at para 52-54. 
72 Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan [1999] FCA 1723 at para 55. 
73 Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan [1999] FCA 1723 at para 57. 
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this in tum then directly impinges on the undertaking of the project subject to the 
financial agreement. By drawing a line at the tax treatment as being the only outcome 
from the decision to issue a certificate, the Comt has taken a narrow literal approach 
arguably at odds with the public interest approach commended in Shop Distributive 
and Allied Employees Association. 
The Court recognised that Allan had an interest in whether the project proceeded, 
and by segmenting this decision from the decision as to tax treatment for the funding 
arguably creates an artificial divide where none existed, as the issuing of a certificate 
led inexorably to the conferral of tax advantages and the commencement of the 
project. The creation of segmentation between the two resultant outcomes which 
arguably follow together may be seen as adopting an approach which is both narrow 
and legalistic. 
However the Court found that it was able to make such a fme distinction. 
4High Court 
As an example of" ... the fortitude required by a citizen who wishes to draw upon 
administrative law procedures for enforcement of modem public statutory duties 
against public authorities and large corporations,"74 there is no better example than 
this case, with such fortitude amply illustrated with an ultimate appeal to the High 
Court75 
However the fortitude was not to be rewarded, with a 5:1 majority of the High Court 
fmding against Allan. 
(a) Majority judgement 
In the joint judgement of the majority/6 there were two questions which would 
determine the appeal. The first was whether s 119 of the DAA Act, providing for 
review of a DAA decision, had any application in respect of a decision by the DAA to 
issue a certificate, or whether it only applied where issue of a certificate had been 
refused. Following from this, if the section allowing review was equally relevant to all 
decisions, the question arose as to whether Allan was a person 'affected by' the 
decision to issue a certificate. 
From its consideration of the first of these questions, it may appear that the majority 
avoided the issue of standing. Section 119 of the DAA Act provided for a person 
affected by a reviewable decision to request reconsideration of the decision. The 
majority judgement effectively concluded that a decision by the DAA to issue a 
certificate was not a reviewable decision, and as such the question of standing for 
Allan did not arise. It would seem that the majority judgement considered that only a 
decision to refuse a certificate could amount to a reviewable decision, and as a 
certificate had been issued in this instance, there was no reviewable decision and no 
basis for reconsideration. This is what the majority appear to suggest in fmding that 
"What is fatal to Mr Allan's case is that he sought involvement in a decision to issue a 
certificate."77 
However, while having determined there was no reviewable decision, thus ending 
the matter, the majority did go on to consider the question of standing. The phrase in s 
74 Allan v Development Allowance Authority [1999] FCA 426 at para I per Merkel J. 
75 Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd [2001] HCA 58; (2001) 48 ATR 253. 
76 Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ. 
77 Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd [2001] HCA 58 at para 3 8. 
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119 referring to a person 'who is affected by a reviewable decision' was seen to have 
an ambulatory operation, and "What serves to identifY a person as one affected by a 
reviewable decision will vary having regard to the nature of the reviewable decision 
itself."78 In looking to identifY persons who would be affected in terms of the current 
legislative framework, the majority concluded that Allan could not come within this 
category. 
The judgement noted that there was no provision in the legislative regime for giving 
notice to the public, or anyone other than the applicant for a certificate, and this was 
seen to demonstrate that "The legislation is not concemed with broader public 
interests such as those relating to the environmental, engineering, social or other 
aspects of the proposed infrastructure project."79 
Further, if members of the public could seek reconsideration of a decision up to 21 
days after becoming aware of the decision, this left open the potential for 
reconsideration at a delayed time, even to the extent of being after completion of the 
project.80 Additionally, as the applicant for the certificate was the borrower, the 
majority considered that it would be an odd result if s 119 allowed Allan to seek 
reconsideration in circumstances where the lender, a party immediately affected by 
the decision, had not been a party to the original application.81 
With the majority rejecting the appeal, at no stage had the matter been considered on 
the merits, even after two Tribunal hearings and five court cases. 
(b) Dissenting view 
Kirby J delivered a strong dissenting judgement broadly centred around the 
shortcomings which he perceived in the application of statutory construction, being 
critical of a narrow approach to statutory interpretation, particularly where this 
approach limited review of administrative decision making. His Honour considered 
that where, as in the current case, interpretation of federal legislation was required, 
ambiguity arose, with "Neither interpretation propounded (being) incontestably 
correct or incorrect."82 Rather, the court needed to choose the preferable construction, 
being in his view " ... the one that strikes the decision-maker as best achieving the 
object of the legislation, as derived from the language in which it is expressed."83 
His Honour noted that the approach to resolving the ambiguity in legislative 
provisions can influence the outcome, with an approach focusing on certain words and 
phrases resulting in the appeal being dismissed, whereas a broader interpretation of 
the words within their context may produce an opposite result. In considering these 
alternatives, Kirby J considered that " ... it is undesirable that a class of persons who 
may enlist the remedial provisions of such legislation should be unnecessarily 
narrowed ... ". 84 
In looking to the right of Allan to request the DAA to reconsider its decision, and 
the AA T to review the decision of the DAA, His Honour considered that it was not 
correct to use as a starting point the decision in Boyce, and the previous High Court 
78 Ibid at para 17. 
79 Ibid at para 34. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid at para 36. 
82 Ibid at para 40. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid at para 41. 
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decisions concerning the general law of standing. Rather, he saw the starting point as 
a close analysis of the legislation85 
In contradistinction to the approach taken by other judges involved in this case, 
Kirby J took the view that: 
There is a contemporary tendency ... to avoid or postpone such statutory analysis out of a 
preference for the general observations of judges concerning identical or analogous legislative 
provisions or principles of the common law. In a case such as the present the correct answer is 
likely to be masked by such an approach.86 
His Honour referred to reviews of the law of standing conducted by the Australian 
Law Reform Commission, and while conceding that much contemporary federal 
legislation reflected the common law principle requiring interference with a private 
right, or special damage, many federal statutes adopted a different formula. This led to 
the view that "The tendency of federal legislation is to move away from authorising 
only particular persons ... or persons limited by a controlling adjective (aggrieved, 
interested), to 'any person' ... ".87 Accordingly, the" ... solution to the problem in a 
particular case must always take as its starting point the language and structure of the 
legislative prescription in question."88 
In regard to the instant case, His Honour identified two main controlling devices, the 
first being ins 119 DAA Act that the person seeking reconsideration be one 'who is 
affected', and the second being that the person making application to the AA T being 
one 'whose interests are affected'. The question for determination was seen as 
whether these requirements had been met at the relevant time, being when the request 
was made to the DAA for reconsideration, and when the application was made to the 
AAT. 
His Honour argued for a broad interpretation of the legislation, the trend of federal 
legislation being to " ... enlarge the scope of rights to initiate administrative review,"89 
and applying a narrow interpretation ran the risk of turning back the clock, and 
departing from the legislative intent of widening " ... the circle of persons who could 
exercise privileges under the applicable administrative law."90 
In arguing for this broad application of the legislation, which His Honour considered 
in this case would grant Allan standing, the point was made that the broad language in 
ss 119 and 120 of the DAA Act demonstrated the Parliamentary intention to permit 
access to the review process. If such had not been the intent of Parliament, then 
Parliament had it within its power to have omitted the review provisions, or to have 
confined them within a narrow reach. 
Urging a public policy perspective, Kirby J saw the systems of review in the DAA 
Act and AA T Act as providing greater transparency in public administration in the 
federal sphere. In relation to the outcomes from the DAA decision, the view expressed 
suggested that inconvenience or disruption to the tax position of others, or to the 
project itself, could ultimately outweigh the duty of officers and entities of the 
Commonwealth to comply with the law. 
Despite the plea by Kirby J against narrow legislative construction, the majority 
found that Allan lacked standing, and the appeal against the decision of the second 
Full Federal Court was dismissed. 
85 Ibid at para 53-54. 
86 Ibid at para 54. 
87 Ibid at para 56. 
88 Ibid at para 56. 
89 Ibid at para 65. 
90 Ibid at para 65. 
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85 Ibid at para 53-54. 
86 Ibid at para 54. 
87 Ibid at para 56. 
88 Ibid at para 56. 
89 Ibid at para 65. 
90 Ibid at para 65. 
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V JUDICIAL REASONING 
While of the five court decisions, three proved unfavourable to the applicant Allan 
in that he was denied standing, the courts in each of the decisions differed in their 
reasoning as to how this result was achieved. Each of the courts looked to statutory 
construction to assist in determining the issue, and while the outcome in each case 
may have been the same, it is instructive to review the alternative interpretations of 
the statute which led to a common result. 
In the Federal Court at first instance, the conclusion of Mansfield J was that if Allan 
was a 'person affected' within the meaning of s 199 of the DAA Act, this being" ... 
apparent whether one looks only to the legislation for the answer to the question, or 
whether one looks to the more general principles enunciated by the High Court ... ".91 
His honour had regard to both of the nominated sources in reaching the conclusion. 
In interpreting the relevant legislation, his Honour adopted the narrow interpretation 
that the review provided by the legislation was intended by Parliament basically only 
for those who were involved as applicants for a DAA decision, or required to be 
infmmed of the outcome of a decision, and that as Allan was not part of this loop, he 
had no standing to seek review. 
From the principles from the High Court cases, an approach against which Kirby J 
warned, Mansfield J concluded that Allan needed to show special damage, and that 
this had not been done in this case. 
The second Full Federal Court adopted a potentially narrower view of the scope of 
the legislation. The decision of the Court found that the question of standing would be 
determined by the interest Allan had in the decision under review, and that the subject 
matter of review was the decision to issue a certificate, the effect of which was to 
transfer tax benefits. As Allan had no interest greater than others in the community as 
to the tax benefits granted, he lacked sufficient interest in the decision. 
By adopting this limiting view of the decision, the Court arguably narrowed the 
scope further, as it appeared to limit the outcome of the decision to immediate 
outcomes. 
On reaching the High Court, it may appear arguable that the Court again narrowed 
further the interpretation oflegislation granting rights of review. 
The majority were able to determine the matter without having to decide on Allan's 
standing, effectively determining that there was no reviewable decision in terms of s 
119 of the DAA Act. In a narrow reading of the legislation, the majority judgement 
concluded that the legislation intended that only a refusal to issue a certificate would 
be a reviewable decision, with a decision to issue a certificate bringing the matter to 
an end. 
In further reasoning the decision did address the question of standing, the majority 
suggesting that other aspects of the legislation, such as there being no requirement to 
give notice of a decision to the public, and the potential delay from the 21 day period 
to lodge requests for reconsideration, also served to suggest that the legislation had no 
concern with broader public interests. However, these further considerations do not 
appear critical to the majority decision which rested on the narrow concept of what 
constituted a reviewable decision under s 119 of the DAA Act. 
91 Peter Allan v Development Allowance Authority [1997]738 FCA at 14. 
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VI THE STANDING OF 'STANDING' IN TAX DISPUTES 
The function performed by statutory rules requiring a person to have standing to 
seek review of an administrative decision is to limit access to the courts or tribunals, 
by acting as a formal filter operated by the judiciary. Such a filtering device serves a 
number of purposes, including, among others, to preclude frivolous actions, to 
forestall the use of courts as a forum for espousing political ideology, and not least to 
deny access to the courts "to a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do 
not concern him."92 
The formal filter provided by the standing rules operates in addition to the more 
informal filters which operate to limit access to the courts, the most readily apparent 
being the cost of litigation. In the taxation context, such an informal filter operates to 
ensure that only those disputes which are genuine, and involve significant sums of tax 
in dispute, will proceed to the court system. 93 
However, as noted in the earlier discussion, Part IVC of the Tax Administration Act 
provides a less costly and more readily available access for review of taxation 
decisions. These provisions deal with review not only of income tax decisions, but 
decisions in relation to all Commonwealth taxes, including goods and services tax and 
fringe benefits tax. With the review provisions being more readily accessible, and the 
increasing range of Commonwealth taxes falling for review under these provisions, 
the 'floodgates' argument would suggest that there would need to be some threshold 
mechanism for access to review, and this threshold is provided in this context by the 
rules for standing. 
It would be expected that a taxpayer, or a taxpayer's representative, would normally 
meet the requirement for standing to seek review of a taxation decision in relation to 
the taxpayer's own affairs, no matter how narrowly the statute defmed standing, or 
how narrowly the courts construed the requirement. The issue then becomes how wide 
a scope there is for other interested parties to be able to instigate a review of a taxation 
decision relating to another taxpayer, and under what circumstances another person 
may seek to have a taxation decision relating to a different taxpayer reviewed. 
The discussion that follows raises some circumstances where such an issue may 
anse. 
One situation where others would have an interest in the outcome of any existing 
taxation dispute of a taxpayer is in the area of bankruptcy and liquidation. The earlier 
discussion examined those cases which have held that a bankrupt taxpayer is an 
exception to the general rule, in that the taxpayer does not have standing to seek 
review of a taxation decision relating to the taxpayer's own affairs, but rather the 
trustee in bankruptcy has standing. This may appear an anomalous result in some 
ways, as it may not always be the case that the interests of the bankrupt taxpayer and 
the interests of the trustee in bankruptcy would coincide. As an example, the trustee in 
bankruptcy may not consider that review of an existing or putative taxation dispute 
would be worth pursuing, while the taxpayer may be better served by seeking review 
of an adverse taxation decision, as a successful outcome from the review may 
significantly ameliorate the financial distress of the taxpayer. 
92 R v Greater London Council; Ex parte Blackburn (1976]1 WLR 550, Lord Denning at 559. 
93 The Australian Taxation Office test case program will also allow for cases involving small amounts 
of tax in dispute, but which involve a significant issue of law, will be an exception to this; see for 
example FCT v McNeil (2007) HCA 5 which involved a sum of around $500 but proceeded to the High 
Court. 
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Further to this example, the issue also arises as to whether standing would be 
available to a creditor in the liquidation of a taxpayer. It may well be that creditors 
could be 'dissatisfied' or 'aggrieved' in relation to an adverse taxation decision 
affecting the taxpayer, and a reversal of the taxation decision on review may have a 
significant impact on the potential outcome from the liquidation, thus giving the 
creditors an interest in the dispute. If the taxpayer is denied standing to seek review of 
the decision, and the trustee in bankmptcy or liquidator decides against seeking 
review of the adverse taxation decision, the creditors may wish to seek review of the 
adverse taxation decision. However, a narrow interpretation of the standing 
requirement would see creditors precluded from being granted standing to pursue 
review of the decision, even though their interests are affected. 
Another situation where one taxpayer would have an interest in the outcome of a 
taxation dispute involving another taxpayer potentially arises in relation to entities 
with some common ownership. While the consolidation provisions, which effectively 
treat a group with common ownership as a single entity, may limit the cases where 
this could arise, not all commonly owned groups would be consolidated. Even if a 
group has consolidated, there may be an entity with some common ownership which 
is not part of the group as it does not satisfy the taxation grouping rules. 
If one of the entities subject to common ownership was subject to an adverse 
taxation decision, but was not seeking review of the decision, it may be arguable that 
a related entity could also be 'dissatisfied' or 'aggrieved' by the decision as the effects 
of the taxation decision could impact adversely on the related entity. In such a case 
the related entity may wish to instigate review of the adverse taxation decision. It may 
be expected that the narrow approach to standing taken by the courts would suggest 
that the courts would be reluctant to allow a related entity to seek review of a taxation 
decision relating to the taxpayer, even though the interests of a related party may be 
detrimentally affected by the taxation decision relating to the taxpayer. 
While the scope to be afforded to the standing rules in relation to taxation decisions 
remains to be fully tested in the courts, the judicial considerations in relation to 
standing in taxation cases to date would suggest that the courts have been adopting a 
narrow approach to the interpretation of the standing provisions. However, as the 
simple examples illustrate, there may be an argument for a broadening of the 
application of the standing rules where taxpayers, other than the taxpayer subject to 
the taxation decision, are adversely impacted by the taxation decision. 
VII CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The question remaining as a result of the court deliberations in the cases is whether 
the arguably narrow legislative interpretations can be reconciled with the ideals of 
transparency and accountability of administrative decision making. 
In looking to the legislative provisions considered in this case, there would appear to 
be a clear progression in that the threshold conditions for review become more 
demanding at higher levels in the review hierarchy. For reconsideration of a DAA 
decision, as provided in s 119 of the DAA Act, the requirement is "a person who is 
affected by a reviewable decision." Section 121 of the DAA Act provided for further 
recourse to the AA T where threshold conditions had been met, the requirement from s 
27(1) of the AAT Act being a person "whose interests are affected". The wording of 
the provisions suggests a gradation in scale from the DAA Act to the AAT Act, which 
would be expected as the review process progresses further up the hierarchy. 
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As noted by Kirby J, this view is reinforced when looking to the next level of review 
under the terms of the ADJR Act, the threshold requirement for which is prescribed in 
s 5(1) of the ADJR Act as being a "person who is aggrieved by a decision." This 
again connotes a more stringent requirement at higher levels of review. 
The reconsideration sought in this case was by the DAA, where it might be expected 
that a 'person who is affected by a reviewable decision' would be given a wide 
reading and interpretation, reflecting the fact that this body sat at the base level of the 
review hierarchy. 
However the Courts at each level declined to adopt a broad interpretation, in each 
case limiting the scope of the provision, although as noted above, arguably for 
different reasons. The result from such a constricting interpretation is to " ... 
(authorise) administrators, by the very substantial decisions they make, to place 
themselves beyond external review."94 
Given that Parliament has the power to constrain or restrict external review if such is 
its intention, it may be seen as a surprising result that where Parliament has not done 
this by clear language, the assumption being that the intention is to leave scope for the 
operation of the administrative law review provisions, the Courts have nevertheless 
been prepared to apply a narrow interpretation and constrict administrative review. 
Such an approach would appear to be at odds with the intent of the rationale behind 
the administrative review regime, and it remains to be seen whether provisions hailed 
as providing transparency and accountability continue to do so, or are emasculated by 
narrow literal interpretations. 
94 Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd [200 I] HCA 58 per Kirby J at para 88. 
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